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CASE NOTE

“I’LL TAKE FORM OVER SUBSTANCE FOR $800, TREBEK”:
WHY BLUEFORD WAS TOO RIGID AND HOW STATES
CAN PROPERLY PROVIDE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION

W ARREN M. K LINGER†
INTRODUCTION
In August 2009, Arkansas tried Alex Blueford for the murder of a oneyear-old child.1 Blueford was charged with capital murder, which included
three lesser oﬀenses: ﬁrst-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent
homicide.2 After deliberation, a jury of Blueford’s peers reported to the trial
judge that it unanimously opposed the charges of capital and ﬁrst-degree
murder,3 yet despite the protection oﬀered by the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment,4 Arkansas attempted to retry Blueford on those
charges.5 Notwithstanding persuasive arguments from Blueford’s counsel, the
Supreme Court held that Blueford was never acquitted of either charge and
was therefore not protected from retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.6

† Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D. Candidate, 2014,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., University of California, Berkeley. I would like to
thank Professor David Rudovsky for his indispensable assistance and guidance, and Bianca Nunes
and Jessica Rice for their diligence with this piece.
1 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2048 (2012).
2 Id.
3 Id. The jury was deadlocked on the charge of manslaughter and did not vote on negligent
homicide. Id.
4 See U.S. C ONST . amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same oﬀence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
5 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2049.
6 Id. at 2053.
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Blueford embodies two distinct yet related propositions. First, the Court
held that the jury foreperson’s report that the jury was unanimous in
opposing capital and ﬁrst-degree murder charges did not constitute an
acquittal as to those charges.7 Second, and more crucially, the Court determined that the trial judge was not required to allow the jury to give eﬀect to
that unanimous vote—either by issuing partial verdict forms or polling the
jury—before ﬁnding that “‘circumstances manifest[ed] a necessity’ to
declare a mistrial.”8 In “cases in which the mistrial was justiﬁed by ‘manifest
necessity,’” the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial.9 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent the state
from retrying Alex Blueford, or a similarly situated defendant, for murder.
Critics asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision to give Arkansas a
“second shot” at convicting Blueford of murder10 directly contravened the
core principles of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause: that the
state should not be allowed to repeatedly attempt to convict individuals for
the same alleged oﬀense, and that the ﬁnality of judgments is of paramount
importance to the smooth functioning of the judicial system.11 So great was
the Framers’ fear of this oppressive practice12 that they expressly protected
against it in the Bill of Rights.
Did the Court actually give states the “proverbial second bite at the apple”13 in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or is there more to this
case? The discrete issue in Blueford is not so much about interpreting the
Double Jeopardy Clause as it is about convoluted jury forms and instructions.14 Part I of this Note provides an overview of double jeopardy jurisprudence. Part II discusses the Blueford decision and analyzes its strengths
and weaknesses, including the Court’s rigid application of past precedent
without consideration for the policy behind the Clause or the practical
implications of its decision. Part III oﬀers solutions to the problem of the
acquittal-ﬁrst instructions presented in Blueford, including eliminating
7
8
9

Id. at 2050.
Id. at 2052-53 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949)).
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 683 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)); see also infra Section I.A.
10 See, e.g., Mike Sacks, Supreme Court Allows Arkansas Second Shot at Murder Trial in Double
Jeopardy Dispute, H UFFINGTON P OST, May ��, ����, http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/����/��/��/
supreme-court-double-jeopardy-arkansas-murder-alex-blueford_n_1542396.html.
11 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
12 See Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2057 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 2053 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
14 See id. at 2058 (discussing the problems that develop in acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdictions and
proposing that trial judges in these jurisdictions honor a defendant’s request for a partial verdict
before declaring a mistrial on the ground of jury deadlock).
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“convict-on-any-or-acquit-on-all” jury forms and requiring judges to
provide partial verdict forms or to poll a jury before declaring a mistrial due
to a hung jury.
I. L EGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause:
What Does It Protect and When Is It Triggered?
The Double Jeopardy Clause, which protects the accused against both
multiple trials and multiple punishments for the same crime, 15 is fundamental to the American justice system:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged oﬀense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . . .16

Over the past two hundred years, the Court has strictly construed the
Double Jeopardy Clause so that its protections apply only when certain
conditions are satisﬁed. Double Jeopardy acts as a bar to a second (or third
or fourth) trial only when jeopardy both attached and terminated during the
earlier proceeding. 17 Attachment occurs when the jury is empaneled and
sworn18 or when a plea is accepted. However, jeopardy only terminates,
thereby barring retrial, “[i]f the defendant is acquitted by the jury, or if he
is convicted”19 or criminally punished for the oﬀense.20
The most controversial facet of double jeopardy jurisprudence, and the
issue in Blueford, stems from the impact of a mistrial on double jeopardy.
The general rule is that when a trial judge declares a mistrial, double
15 Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Price v.
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970) (“The ‘twice put in jeopardy’ language of the Constitution thus
relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused for a second time will be convicted of the ‘same
oﬀense’ for which he was initially tried.”).
16 Green, 355 U.S. at 187; see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
569 (1977).
17 See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173-74 (1873).
18 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978).
19 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 682 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
20 See, e.g., Price, 398 U.S. at 326-�� (holding that a conviction of a lesser included oﬀense
barred a second trial for the greater oﬀense).
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jeopardy bars retrial, with an exception for “cases in which the mistrial was
justiﬁed by ‘manifest necessity.’” 21 This exception, however, has largely
swallowed the rule. Demonstrating manifest necessity has become such a
low burden that, except in rare instances, mistrials do not bar retrial.
The doctrine of manifest necessity ﬁrst developed in 1824 in the seminal
case, United States v. Perez.22 In Perez, the trial judge discharged the jury and
declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to agree on a verdict.23 The
Court held that because the defendant had been neither convicted nor
acquitted, there was “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial, and jeopardy
thus did not bar retrial.24 Manifest necessity is a ﬂuid concept, but a hung
jury—as in Blueford—has repeatedly been found to qualify, thereby circumventing double jeopardy and permitting retrial.25
Blueford is therefore not a straightforward case about the proper interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but rather a complicated inquiry
into what constitutes manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.
B. Acquittal-First Instructions
Alex Blueford’s appeal would not have reached the Arkansas Supreme
Court—let alone the United States Supreme Court—had Arkansas not been
an “acquittal-ﬁrst” jurisdiction. As a matter of Arkansas law, before a jury
may consider a lesser included oﬀense, it must “ﬁrst determine that the
proof is insuﬃcient to convict on the greater oﬀense.”26 In other words,
unless a jury votes unanimously to acquit on the greater charge, it cannot
deliberate over a lesser charge.27
Acquittal-ﬁrst instructions developed after, and primarily in response to,
the advent of the lesser included oﬀense instruction, which provides that,
“[a] jury [is] permitted to ﬁnd [a] defendant guilty of any lesser oﬀense

21 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 683 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
22 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
23 Id. at 579.
24 Id. at 580.
25 See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862-63 (2010) (“[W]hen a judge discharges a jury
on the grounds that the jury cannot reach a verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a
new trial for the defendant before a new jury.” (citing Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579-80)).
26 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2054 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
27 Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 66 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Ark. 2002)). But see Brief of Amici Curiae
State of Michigan, 22 Other States & 1 Territory in Support of the State of Arkansas at 17,
Blueford, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 10-1320), 2012 WL 105561 (arguing that Arkansas “is not an ‘acquittal
ﬁrst’ jurisdiction” because the jury instructions do not explicitly require unanimity or acquittal
before the jury moves on to lesser oﬀenses).
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necessarily included in the oﬀense charged.”28 For example, in a jurisdiction
allowing for lesser included oﬀenses, if a defendant is charged with murder,
the jury may also ﬁnd the defendant guilty of manslaughter. Although the
lesser included oﬀense rule “originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in which the proof failed to establish some element of the
crime charged,”29 courts began viewing the rule as beneﬁcial to defendants
because it “ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full beneﬁt of
the reasonable-doubt standard.”30 In response to the lesser included oﬀense
rule, states developed acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions to ensure that the
greatest oﬀense would always be deliberated on and to prevent juries from
voting to convict on a lesser charge merely to avoid conﬂict.31
There are three traditional approaches to jury instructions when lesser
included oﬀenses are submitted to the jury: (1) the acquittal-ﬁrst instruction
or “step approach,” which requires a unanimous jury acquittal of the greater
charge before the jury may proceed to consider a lesser charge; (2) the
“unable to agree” charge, which directs the jury to consider a lesser charge
only if it is unable to agree on the greater charge; and (3) the “unstructured”
approach, which does not require any particular sequence of deliberation.32
Critics argue that acquittal-ﬁrst instructions coerce jurors, hinder judicial eﬃciency by producing more hung juries, and invade the jury’s province as ultimate fact-ﬁnder. 33 Proponents of acquittal-ﬁrst instructions
assert that they improve the functioning of the constitutionally mandated
jury system because they (1) ensure that a jury thoroughly deliberates on
each oﬀense, (2) produce a conclusive decision on each oﬀense considered,
and (3) guard against compromise verdicts.34 Prior to Blueford, the Court

28
29
30

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 634 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973)); see also David F.
Abele, Comment, Jury Deliberations and the Lesser Included Oﬀense Rule: Getting the Courts Back in
Step, 23 U.C. D AVIS L. R EV. 375, 377 (1990) (“A jury can more accurately determine the degree of
a defendant's guilt, if any, with this additional option.”).
31 See, e.g., People v. Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that “jury
votes on included oﬀenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in an eﬀort to reach
unanimity”).
32 People v. Helliger, 691 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (citing Abele, supra note
30, at 380-82).
33 See, e.g., Abele, supra note 30, at 382-90.
34 See id. at 397-98. In a compromise verdict, the jury avoids fully discussing the greater
oﬀense by convicting on a lesser included oﬀense on which all jurors can agree. See id. at 390 n.136
(listing ﬁve categories of compromise verdicts).
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had looked unfavorably upon this type of instruction,35 yet had failed to
substantively address the issue of whether acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions
could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C. Single Verdict Jury Forms
Also signiﬁcant in Blueford is that Arkansas used single verdict, convicton-any-or-acquit-on-all jury forms. Under the direction of a single verdict
jury form, a jury has only three options: (1) convict on any charge, (2)
acquit on all charges, or (3) hang.36 The jury does not have the opportunity
to acquit on only some of the charges (i.e., to issue a partial verdict). The
problem presented by single verdict jury forms in an acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdiction had not been contemplated by the Court prior to Blueford.
II. THE D ECISION: BLUEFORD V. A RKANSAS
A. Factual and Procedural Setting
In 2008, Arkansas charged Alex Blueford with capital murder, ﬁrstdegree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide.37 Arkansas alleged
that “Blueford, acting under circumstances manifesting an extreme indiﬀerence to the value of human life, caused the death of Matthew McFadden,
Jr., a person fourteen years of age or younger.”38 At the close of the trial,
the judge instructed the jury on the pertinent deﬁnitions of each of the four
charges.39 Before directing the jury to commence deliberations, the trial judge
delivered the following instruction under Arkansas’s acquittal-ﬁrst rule:
If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of
capital murder, you will consider the charge of murder in the ﬁrst degree. . . .
If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of
murder in the ﬁrst degree, you will then consider the charge of manslaughter. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the

35 See Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 690-91 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“By requiring Spisak’s jury to decide ﬁrst whether the State had met
its burden with respect to the death sentence, and to reach that decision unanimously, the
instructions deprived the jury of a meaningful opportunity to consider the third option that was
before it, namely, a life sentence.”).
36 See Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2012).
37 Blueford v. State, 370 S.W.3d 496, 497 (Ark. 2011), aﬀ ’d, 132 S. Ct. 2044.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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charge of manslaughter, you will then consider the charge of negligent homicide.40

The court then presented the jury with a set of verdict forms, allowing
the jury to either convict Blueford of one of the charged oﬀenses or acquit
him of all oﬀenses; the jury was not permitted to acquit on some oﬀenses
but not others.41
After deliberating for a few hours, the jury foreperson reported to the
trial judge that the jury was deadlocked. 42 The court inquired as to the
jury’s progress on each oﬀense and the foreperson disclosed that the jury
was unanimous against the charges of capital murder and ﬁrst-degree
murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not yet voted on negligent homicide. 43 The court ordered the jury to continue deliberation. 44
After another thirty minutes, the jury remained deadlocked.45 Without repolling the jury on its progress with respect to each of the four charges or
providing partial verdict forms, the court declared a mistrial.46
When Arkansas subsequently sought to retry Blueford for capital and
ﬁrst-degree murder, he moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy
grounds.47 Blueford argued that the jury foreperson’s report constituted an
express acquittal as to the capital and ﬁrst-degree murder charges, or in the
alternative, that the jury’s consideration of the lesser charges constituted an
implicit acquittal as to the greater.48

40 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2048 (ellipses in original). This language, taken directly from Arkansas’s model criminal jury instruction, A RKANSAS M ODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: C RIMINAL No.
302 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Criminal Jury Instructions, 2d ed. 1994), has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Arkansas as requiring a jury to complete its deliberations on a greater
oﬀense before it may consider a lesser. See Hughes v. State, 66 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Ark. 2002)
(“[B]efore [a jury] may consider any lesser-included oﬀense, the jury must ﬁrst determine that the
proof is insuﬃcient to convict on the greater oﬀense. Thus, the jury must, in essence, acquit the
defendant of the greater oﬀense before considering his or her guilt on the lesser-included oﬀense.”).
41 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2049. I also refer to these jury instructions as “single verdict” or
“convict-on-any-or-acquit-on-all” instructions.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. As mentioned in Section I.A, supra, a mistrial does not bar retrial under the Double
Jeopardy Clause if declaration of a mistrial is manifestly necessary.
47 Id.
48 See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Blueford, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 10-1320), 2011 WL 5971358
(“[T]he jury instructions establish acquittals on the greater oﬀenses by virtue of the jury’s
deadlock on the lesser-included oﬀense.”).
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Arkansas asserted that the foreperson’s report was not an acquittal because
it did not bear the hallmarks of ﬁnality,49 and that the acquittal-ﬁrst jury
instructions did not render the mid-deliberation report of the jury’s deadlock
an implicit acquittal.50 The state argued that this was a standard case in which
a deadlocked jury manifestly necessitated the declaration of a mistrial.51 The
trial court denied Blueford’s motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court of
Arkansas aﬃrmed on interlocutory appeal.52 On October 11, 2011, the United
States Supreme Court granted Blueford’s petition for certiorari.53
B. Why Grant Certiorari?
Does a jury foreperson’s report to a judge carry any weight? Do criminal
defendants have a constitutional right to partial verdicts? Does the refusal
of a court to poll the jury preclude manifest necessity for granting a mistrial
and, therefore, bar retrial under the concept of double jeopardy? The
Blueford Court would implicitly or explicitly resolve all of these questions.
The Court faced two primary issues in Blueford: (1) whether to require
additional action—either by providing partial verdict forms or polling the
jury—before a trial judge may declare a mistrial under the doctrine of
manifest necessity,54 and (2) what impact acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions
should have on the ﬁnality of jury verdicts, including whether a foreman’s
report to a judge constitutes an acquittal.55
This ﬁrst issue has sparked debate among lower courts in recent years.56
A majority of acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdictions have held that “polling the jury on
the various possible verdicts submitted to it would constitute an unwarranted
and unwise intrusion into the province of the jury,”57 reasoning that “jury
votes on included oﬀenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in

49 See Brief for Respondent at 9, Blueford, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 10-1320), 2012 WL 20549
(arguing that an acquittal “is a resolution; it represents juror agreement at the end of deliberations;
it is unmistakably clear when it is issued; and it ordinarily cannot be reconsidered once it is
accepted”).
50 See id. at 10-11.
51 Id. at 8.
52 Blueford v. State, 370 S.W.3d 496, 499, 502 (Ark. 2011), aﬀ ’d, 132 S. Ct. 2044.
53 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 397, 397 (2011).
54 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2052.
55 Id. at 2051.
56 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roth, 776 N.E.2d 437, 447 n.10 (Mass. 2002) (asserting that
several jurisdictions have expressed “diametrically opposed” views on the subject of partial
verdicts’ impact on double jeopardy).
57 State v. Booker, 293 S.E.2d 78, 80-81 (N.C. 1982) (emphasis omitted) (quoting People v.
Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
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an eﬀort to reach unanimity.”58 A minority of jurisdictions, however, require
partial verdicts before declaring a mistrial owing to a hung jury. These
states show greater deference to the concept of manifest necessity and
declare that there can be no manifest necessity warranting the declaration of
a mistrial where the trial court makes no inquiry into the jury’s deliberations as to the greater oﬀenses.59 The minority has held that a judge must
poll the jury before declaring a mistrial because, if the jury is deadlocked
only as to the lesser oﬀenses, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a partial
verdict of acquittal as to the greater oﬀenses.60
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority in resolving the issues presented in Blueford. The Court found, by a 6–3 margin, that double jeopardy
did not bar retrial because Blueford was neither convicted nor acquitted of
any of the charges against him. 61 In reaching this holding, the Court
addressed two issues. First, the Court determined that the jury foreperson’s
report—explaining that the jury unanimously opposed the capital and ﬁrstdegree murder charges—did not constitute an acquittal.62 Second, the Court
declared that the trial court was not required to take further action before
declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity.63
In rejecting the notion that the trial judge should have taken action to
determine whether the jury remained unanimous against the greater
charges, Chief Justice Roberts relied heavily on past precedent, noting “[w]e
have never required a trial court, before declaring a mistrial because of a
hung jury, to consider any particular means of breaking the impasse—let
alone to consider giving the jury new options for a verdict.”64 The Chief

58
59

Hickey, 303 N.W.2d at 21.
See, e.g., Stone v. Superior Court, 646 P.2d 809, 820 (Cal. 1982) (en banc). Several states
have held that there can be no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial where the trial court fails to
inquire as to a partial verdict. See, e.g., State v. Tate, 773 A.2d 308, 324-25 (Conn. 2001); State v.
Pugliese, 422 A.2d 1319, 1321 (N.H. 1980); see also Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277-78 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1991).
60 See Stone, 646 P.2d at 820.
61 See Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2012).
62 Id. at 2050.
63 Id. at 2052-53.
64 Id. at 2052.
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Justice was not blind to the fact that, because of the unique jury forms, the
jury did not have the option to partially acquit.65
After brusquely resolving the partial verdict issue—the main subject of
the circuit split—Chief Justice Roberts dedicated most of the opinion to
explaining that the jury foreperson’s report lacked ﬁnality and, therefore,
constituted neither an implicit nor explicit acquittal.66 The Chief Justice
explained that the foreperson’s report “was not a ﬁnal resolution of anything” because it was made before the jury had concluded deliberations,
thus depriving it of the ﬁnality necessary to constitute an acquittal.67
Chief Justice Roberts further emphasized the need for ﬁnality by rejecting any analogy to two previous Supreme Court cases that discussed
implicit acquittals, Green v. United States68 and Price v. Georgia69—cases on
which Blueford heavily relied.70 In Green and Price, the Chief Justice noted,
the Court held that “the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when a defendant, tried for a greater oﬀense and convicted of a lesser included oﬀense, is
later retried for the greater oﬀense.”71 Blueford argued that the only diﬀerence between his case and Green and Price was that in those cases, the defendant was actually convicted, whereas in Blueford’s case, the jury was
deadlocked—a distinction that should “only favor[] him, because the
Double Jeopardy Clause should, if anything, aﬀord greater protection to a
defendant who is not found guilty of the lesser included oﬀense.”72 Chief
Justice Roberts rejected this argument, concluding that it unjustiﬁably
assumed that “the votes reported by the foreperson did not change, even
though the jury deliberated further after that report.”73
In rejecting Blueford’s argument that “an acquittal is a matter of substance,”74 Chief Justice Roberts essentially admitted that he was exalting form
over substance. He substantiated his reasoning by devising hypothetical
65 See id. (“As permitted under Arkansas law, the jury’s options in this case were limited to
two: either convict on one of the oﬀenses, or acquit on all.”).
66 The implicit or explicit nature of an acquittal is irrelevant to the double jeopardy inquiry.
Retrial is barred “whether that acquittal is express or implied by a conviction on a lesser included
oﬀense when the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater charge.” Price
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (footnote omitted).
67 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2050.
68 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
69 398 U.S. 323.
70 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 15 (citing Green and Price to argue that the “Court
repeatedly has concluded that a jury has reached a verdict based on what is necessarily implied by
its actions”).
71 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2052 (citing Price, 398 U.S. at 329; Green, 355 U.S. at 190).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2050.
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situations to demonstrate why the foreperson’s report lacked the ﬁnality
necessary to bar retrial. After acknowledging that “[a] jury is presumed to
follow its instructions,”75 the Chief Justice concluded that, hypothetically,
the jury could nevertheless have changed its mind about one of the greater
oﬀenses after deliberating over a lesser oﬀense—arguably in contravention
of its instructions76—since votes taken in a jury room prior to being returned
in open court are merely preliminary and are not binding on the jury.77
D. The Dissent
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, highlights several of the weaknesses in the
majority’s analysis and ﬁnds that, by exalting form over substance, the
majority broke the cardinal rule of not allowing the state another “bite at
the apple.”78 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent provides the better assessment of
the case because it directly addresses the salient issues that arise in acquittal-ﬁrst, single verdict jurisdictions. The dissent explains that although the
Arkansas acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions do not expressly forbid reconsideration, the way they are written and the manner in which they were explained
to the jury clearly indicate that the jury did intend to acquit Blueford on the
capital and ﬁrst-degree murder charges. 79 Justice Sotomayor emphasized
that if the concern was ﬁnality, the foreperson’s colloquy with the judge left
little doubt that the jury’s deliberations as to the capital and ﬁrst-degree
murder charges were unanimous.80
Justice Sotomayor would have held that Blueford was acquitted of capital and ﬁrst-degree murder81 or, at a minimum, that double jeopardy barred
retrial on those charges because the trial court should have taken further
action (and honored Blueford’s request for a partial verdict) before declaring
a mistrial. 82 Justice Sotomayor’s approach would have more properly
safeguarded against double jeopardy violations.
75
76

Id. at 2051 (quoting Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000)).
Id. at 2054 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The State's closing arguments repeated this directive:
‘[B]efore you can consider a lesser included of capital murder, you must ﬁrst, all ��, vote that this
man is not guilty of capital murder.’” (alteration in original)).
77 Id. at 2051 (majority opinion).
78 Id. at 2053 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
79 Id. at 2056-57.
80 Id. at 2056.
81 Id. at 2054-55.
82 See id. at 2058 (noting that while a jury’s “genuine inability” to reach a verdict constitutes
manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, a jury in an acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdiction “that advances to
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E. Analysis of the Decision
1. Strengths
Before discussing the decision’s weaknesses, it is worth recognizing what
the Court did right. Though this Note contends that Blueford was wrongly
decided, the decision does have several strengths: its easy-to-follow, brightline rule on ﬁnality; its preservation of jury rooms as black boxes; and its
deference to the Court’s past double jeopardy decisions, as well as those of
lower courts.
The ﬁrst strength of the decision is Chief Justice Roberts’s establishment of a bright-line—though ultimately too formalistic—rule: that a
foreman’s report in open court is not an acquittal. There is continuous
debate over rules versus standards and “whether the certainty and evenhandedness of a clear, bright-line rule justiﬁes the possibility that the rule
may work imperfectly in some cases.”83 The rule that an acquittal cannot
occur while a jury is still deliberating makes double jeopardy issues easier to
resolve. Furthermore, the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the need for ﬁnality
is especially ﬁtting because one of the main policy justiﬁcations behind the
Double Jeopardy Clause is the importance of the ﬁnality of decisions, be
they acquittals or convictions.84
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion valiantly attempts to protect the
clandestine jury process. Requiring judges to inquire into the details of a
jury’s deliberations before they have concluded could hinder this furtive
process.85 Juries are black boxes and they need not justify their verdicts nor
explain their reasoning, but rather, should remain “completely independent:
of the state, of the parties and of the community itself.”86 “Unlike most
aspects of a criminal trial that are open for everyone to see, jury deliberations

the consideration of a lesser included oﬀense has not demonstrated [such] an inability” with
respect to the greater oﬀense).
83 Teare v. Comm. on Admissions, 566 A.2d 23, 30 (D.C. 1989).
84 See, e.g., Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2365-66 (2009).
85 I argue later, however, that this argument falls ﬂat. See infra Section III.B; cf. Mary S.
O’Keefe, Note, Acceptance of Partial Verdicts as a Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy, 53 F ORDHAM
L. R EV. 889, 898 (1985) (“The contention that a partial verdict would be coercive because it
requires an ‘unwarranted and unwise intrusion into the province of the jury’ is equally unsupported
by the facts surrounding the receipt of a partial verdict. Coercion is only a concern when the jury
is still considering its verdict. A deadlocked jury has completed its deliberations; inquiry into
whether a partial verdict has been reached will therefore not be intrusive.” (footnotes omitted)).
86 Barbara A. Babcock, Opinion, Preserving the Jury's Privacy, N.Y. T IMES ( July 24, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/24/opinion/preserving-the-jury-s-privacy.html.
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are secret. There are no exact procedures that jurors must follow during these
deliberations. The jury is free to deliberate in any manner that it sees ﬁt.”87
Third, the Court deferred to both lower court decisions and past precedent. Double jeopardy jurisprudence has long placed tremendous weight on
deference to lower court judges: “The decision whether to grant a mistrial is
reserved to the ‘broad discretion’ of the trial judge, a point that ‘has been
consistently reiterated in decisions of this Court.’”88 Chief Justice Roberts
relied heavily on past precedent in determining that the trial judge was not
required to take action before declaring a mistrial. 89 The fact that the
“Court had never ‘overturned a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial after a
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the ground that the “manifest
necessity” standard had not been met’”90 made the majority understandably
hesitant to do so for the ﬁrst time in Blueford. Although the resulting decision
was admittedly rigid, it gave deference to almost two hundred years of case
law, thereby strengthening the past rulings of the Supreme Court.
Ultimately, the majority opinion is fairly persuasive. It establishes an
easy-to-follow rule that promotes the goal of ﬁnality, protects the integrity
of the jury system, gives fair deference to lower court judges, and is consistent with hundreds of years of developing case law. The decision’s
weaknesses and omissions, however, cannot be ignored.
2. Missing the Forest for the Trees:
Exploring Blueford’s Weaknesses
Despite its strengths, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is, in the end, too
formalistic. It draws bright lines that are too rigid and may lead to adverse
results, it is too deferential to past precedent, and it fails to substantively
address Arkansas’s unique jury instructions. By interpreting the Double
Jeopardy Clause so narrowly and failing to account for the policy rationale

87 Deliberations in the Jury Room, L AWYERS . COM , http://criminal.lawyers.com/CriminalLaw-Basics/Deliberations-in-the-Jury-Room.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); see also Julie A.
Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 E MORY L.J. 427, 432 (2008) (noting that juries perform their role “as fact
ﬁnder shrouded in secrecy, and it is impossible to say why or how the jury convicted or acquitted
in any given case”).
88 Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1863 (2010) (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,
462 (1973)); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 (1978) (“The trial judge’s decision to
declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a
reviewing court.”).
89 See Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2012).
90 Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1864 (quoting Winston v. Moore, 452 U.S. 944, 947 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
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behind it, the Court failed to provide proper protection to citizens facing
retrial.
Although line-drawing is often arbitrary, bright-line rules provide certain undeniable beneﬁts: judicial economy, predictability, and fairness.
Where, however, the line drawn by the court is too formalistic, it can lead
to absurd outcomes.91 As the Blueford dissent recognized, “[i]n ascertaining
whether an acquittal has occurred, ‘form is not to be exalted over substance.’”92 The Court failed to give proper weight to the undeniable implication of the intersection between acquittal-ﬁrst instructions and double
jeopardy—that is, if a jury must acquit on a greater charge before considering a lesser, by deliberating on that lesser charge, the jury has functionally
acquitted as to the greater.
The majority focused heavily on ﬁnality but failed to appreciate that in
acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdictions, ﬁnality is often unattainable. Chief Justice
Roberts’s conclusion that the jury foreperson’s report was not ﬁnal cannot
be reconciled with acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions generally. At crucial
times, the Court seemed to contradict its own reasoning. For example, the
Chief Justice stated that a jury is presumed to follow its instructions. 93
According to this logic, the jury would have had to ﬁrst acquit Blueford of
the greater charges before deliberating on the lesser. However, Chief Justice
Roberts ultimately justiﬁed the majority’s holding by arguing that in
acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdictions, there is nothing preventing the jury from later
changing its mind as to the greater charge.94 This argument fails.
First, given the circumstances of the case, not only did the jury probably
intend to acquit Blueford of capital and ﬁrst-degree murder, but also, under
the acquittal-ﬁrst instructions, its report was, as a logical matter, ﬁnal. The
trial court’s instructions—that if the jurors had a reasonable doubt as to
Blueford’s guilt on a greater charge, they must then deliberate on a lesser
charge—are telling: “reasonable doubt” is the burden of proof in a criminal
prosecution in Arkansas.95 So, if it is fair to assume that the jurors followed
the instructions of the trial court, it must also be fair to assume—as Justice

91 See, e.g., Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2056 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that, in substance,
the announcement in open court of the jury’s unanimous vote against the capital and ﬁrst-degree
murder charges was tantamount to a formal acquittal, yet this announcement oﬀered Blueford no
double jeopardy protection).
92 Id. (quoting Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 66 (1978)).
93 Id. at 2051 (majority opinion).
94 Id.
95 A RKANSAS M ODEL J URY I NSTRUCTIONS : C RIMINAL No. 110 (Ark. Supreme Court
Comm. on Criminal Jury Instructions, 2d ed. 1994).
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Sotomayor noted in dissent96—that the jury did not move on to deliberate
the lesser charges until it had made a deﬁnitive determination that the
prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof as to the greater charges.
Indeed, the prosecution clariﬁed for the jury that “before you can consider a
lesser included of capital murder, you must ﬁrst, all ��, vote that this man is
not guilty of capital murder,” 97 explaining that this was “not a situation
where you just lay everything out here and say, well, we have four choices.
Which one does it ﬁt the most?”98 Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that the
jury could have subsequently reconsidered its unanimous vote does not hold
water as applied to the facts of this case.99
Second, the Court was overly deferential to the trial judge’s ﬁnding of
manifest necessity. Although the Court has “expressly declined to require
the ‘mechanical application’ of any ‘rigid formula’ when a trial judge decides
to declare a mistrial due to jury deadlock,”100 the Court has emphasized that
manifest necessity is a high bar: “[T]he power ought to be used with the
greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious
causes . . . .”101 Such urgent circumstances were not present in Blueford. In
order to provide citizens with full double jeopardy protection under the
Fifth Amendment, the Court should have subjected the trial judge’s
decision to declare a mistrial to greater scrutiny.
Third, Blueford essentially eliminated “implicit acquittals” in acquittalﬁrst jurisdictions, except in situations where the jury convicts on one of the
lesser charges. Courts have regularly held that when a jury convicts on a
lesser included charge, the defendant has been implicitly acquitted on the

96
97
98
99

Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2054 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2048 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Id.
Although from a formalist perspective, Justice Roberts was correct that “nothing in the
instructions prohibited the jury from reconsidering such a vote,” id. at 2051, I do not agree that the
jury either believed it could reconsider or intended to reconsider. As Justice Sotomayor argued,
the jury “scrupulously” followed its instructions to unanimously acquit of the more serious charges
before moving forward, and the only plausible inference is that the jurors spent the thirty minutes
after the forewoman announced the jury’s unanimous vote debating not the greater charges on
which all were agreed, but the charge of manslaughter on which they were deadlocked. See id. at
2056 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
100 Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (2010) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691
(1949)).
101 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The Court has consistently
reiterated this high bar for establishing manifest necessity. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497, 506 (1978) (requiring a “high degree” of necessity before concluding that a mistrial is
appropriate).
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greater charges.102 Blueford makes clear that a jury deadlocked on the lesser
charge does not merit the same treatment. As the Blueford dissent recognized, however, “[i]t would be anomalous if the Double Jeopardy Clause
oﬀered less protection to a defendant whose jury has deadlocked on the
lesser and thus convicted of nothing at all.”103 Under Blueford’s reasoning, in
a convict-on-any-or-acquit-on-all jurisdiction, if a jury unanimously voted
to acquit Defendant A on ﬁrst-degree murder but was hung on negligent
homicide, double jeopardy protection would not be triggered. Yet, if with
respect to Defendant B, that same jury voted unanimously against ﬁrstdegree murder but convicted on negligent homicide, Defendant B would be
entitled to double jeopardy protection against retrial on the ﬁrst-degree
murder charge. Therefore, at least with respect to double jeopardy, Defendant B would be better oﬀ than Defendant A, against whom the prosecution
presumably had a weaker case.
Fourth, the Court should have spent more time addressing acquittalﬁrst jury instructions and whether the trial judge was required to poll the
jury or provide partial verdict forms before declaring a mistrial. Most
notable in the Blueford decision is not what Chief Justice Roberts wrote, but
what he failed to write. The legally formalistic decision is almost completely
devoid of any substantive discussion of acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions or
partial verdicts. The key legal issue in Blueford stems from the implications
of acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions on the operation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, but even after Blueford, that issue remains largely unresolved.
III. OPTIONS A FTER BLUEFORD
Despite Blueford’s attempt to draw clear, bright-line rules, Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion leaves many issues unresolved. To best resolve these
issues while respecting the Court’s decision, state legislatures should eliminate acquittal-ﬁrst instructions altogether or, at a minimum, require trial
judges to poll the jury or provide partial verdict forms before ﬁnding
manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.

102 See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 190 (1957); People v. Gause, 971 N.E.2d 341, 342 (N.Y. 2012).
103 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2058 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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A. States Should Eliminate Acquittal-First Instructions
with Single Verdict Forms
Although the Blueford Court refused to hold them unconstitutional,104
states should eliminate acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions with single verdict
forms105 because they impinge on protections that are vital to our criminal
justice system.106 Before Blueford, the Court had, in certain circumstances,
questioned the validity of jury instructions that limited a jury’s options for
conviction.107 While there are both beneﬁts and drawbacks to acquittal-ﬁrst
instructions,108 when paired with a failure to poll the jury or to provide
partial verdict forms, they impede double jeopardy protection and encroach
on the province of the jury.
Acquittal-ﬁrst instructions, combined with single verdict forms, give the
state too much power. The state, with all of its resources, should not be able
to use coercive jury forms or confusing instructions to ensure conviction. If
the prosecution cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it should
not be able to manipulate the jury’s deliberations to increase the likelihood
of either conviction on a lesser oﬀense or a hung jury, thereby giving the
state another “bite at the apple.”109

104 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts largely glossed over the question of the constitutionality of
acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions.
105 Some states have already done so. See, e.g., State v. LeBlanc, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (Ariz.
1996) (en banc) (concluding that the elimination of acquittal-ﬁrst instructions “reduces the risks of
false unanimity and coerced verdicts [because] [w]hen jurors harbor a doubt as to guilt on the
greater oﬀense but are convinced the defendant is culpable to a lesser degree, they may be more
apt to vote for conviction on the principal charge out of fear that to do otherwise would permit a
guilty person to go free”); Green v. State, 80 P.3d 93, 96 (Nev. 2003) (rejecting the use of an
acquittal-ﬁrst transition instruction because it “improperly invites compromise verdicts,” and
approving the use of an “unable to agree” transition instruction).
106 There are, however, many states that use these instructions, including but not limited to
Alaska, California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Mexico. See Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at
2058 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
107 Cf., e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (holding it unconstitutional to withhold from a jury the option of convicting a capital defendant of a lesser included oﬀense).
Although Beck did not speciﬁcally deal with acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions, the instructions that
the Court found unconstitutional stiﬂed the jury’s deliberations and actions in the same way that
the Blueford instructions, which prohibited the jury from issuing a partial verdict, did.
108 See Laura Anne Cooper, Comment, Should Juries Be Able to Agree to Disagree?: People v.
Boettcher and the “Unanimous Acquittal First” Instruction, 54 BROOK. L. R EV. 1027, 1044-48 (1988);
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
109 See supra text accompanying note 78; cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507-08
(1978) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to prevent prosecutors from declaring
a mistrial in order to obtain a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant).
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Under Blueford, there is nothing to prevent an overzealous prosecutor
from abusing the lesser included oﬀense instruction when the state’s
evidence is insuﬃcient, thereby allowing the state a “second shot” at
conviction. If a prosecutor, who is certain the defendant is guilty but cannot
prove it, added some lesser included oﬀense hoping to hang the jury, she
might be able to buy the state more time to ﬁnd evidence.110 Of course,
juries are more likely to hang whenever lesser included oﬀenses are charged,
but without single verdict forms, they will be more likely to ﬁnd a charge
on which all jurors agree—even if that agreement comes in the form of
acquittal as to the greater charge.
Acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions with single verdict forms also impede
the jury process. The U.S. justice system uses a secret jury process because
juries require independence to come to an accurate, unanimous decision.111
These jury instructions interfere with how a jury deliberates, but provide no
legitimate countervailing, justice-promoting beneﬁts. The jury’s free will
regarding how to most justly and eﬃciently deliberate is overridden.112
The issues raised in Blueford could therefore evaporate if states, either
through judicial decree or legislation, banned the concurrent use of single
verdict jury forms and acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions.
B. States Should Mandate that Trial Judges
Take Action Before Declaring a Mistrial
Even if states choose not to do away with acquittal-ﬁrst instructions,
there are less drastic measures available to remedy the problems created by
Blueford. Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Blueford dissent, got it right
when she proﬀered, “I would therefore hold that the Double Jeopardy
Clause requires a trial judge, in an acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdiction, to honor a
defendant’s request for a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial on the
ground of jury deadlock.”113 This remedy—which could be implemented by

110 Cf. generally Catherine L. Carpenter, The All-or-Nothing Doctrine in Criminal Cases: Independent Trial Strategy or Gamesmanship Gone Awry?, 26 A M. J. C RIM. L. 257 (1999) (discussing
parties’ strategies in deciding whether to ask the court to instruct the jury on lesser included
oﬀenses); Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional Practices and Policies by
Prosecutors’ Oﬃces, 52 W ASHBURN L.J. 1 (2012) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct, especially
when prosecutors purposefully violate defendants’ constitutional rights).
111 See generally Seaman, supra note 87.
112 In extreme cases like Blueford, acquittal-ﬁrst instructions combined with single verdict
forms lead to a result no diﬀerent from a judge refusing to acknowledge a jury’s verdict and
declaring a mistrial.
113 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2058 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the legislature or by courts—would reinstitute the seemingly forgotten high
bar of manifest necessity.
Defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights are not adequately protected if
judges in acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdictions retain the discretion to decline to poll
juries before declaring a mistrial. One commentator noted that “judges now
know that if they want to prevent a retrial of charges that the jury has
already acquitted, they must get a formal statement of a verdict on all
counts from hung juries,” but a judge with the primary goal of preserving
the prosecutor’s options could “simply do what the judge did in Blueford.”114
But judges should not be able to “preserve the prosecutor’s options”115: the
Double Jeopardy Clause is expressly aimed at preventing this type of
manipulative behavior.116
This solution is consistent with Blueford because the Court, though holding that a judge is not required to poll the jury or to oﬀer partial verdict
forms, made no mention of whether states could mandate that judges follow
this procedure—and thus neither expressly nor impliedly banned any such
rule or law. Constitutional protections relating to criminal procedure are the
ﬂoor, not the ceiling, and a state remains free to provide greater protection
to its citizens than the Constitution requires.117 For jurisdictions that, prior
to Blueford, required partial verdicts before the declaration of a mistrial
owing to a hung jury,118 there is no constitutional barrier preventing them
from continuing to do so.
Requiring trial judges to poll an alleged hung jury before declaring a
mistrial would not intrude upon the jury process or overrule precedent, but
would instead create a procedural safeguard for the Double Jeopardy
Clause—similar to the now-mandated Miranda warnings, which protect the
Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination. 119 Further, if trial
judges were required to take a quick poll, signiﬁcant government resources
would be conserved by avoiding retrial (on some or all charges), which
would drastically increase judicial eﬃciency.
114
115
116
117

Craig M. Bradley, What Is Double Jeopardy?, T RIAL, Dec. 2012, at 52, 53.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
“Michigan simply provided greater protection to one of its citizens than some other State might
provide or, indeed, than this Court might require throughout the country”).
118 See supra note 60.
119 Miranda warnings are not themselves constitutionally required, Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 443-�� (����), but function as procedural safeguards through which to eﬀectuate the
Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed protections.
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Some courts label jury polling “an unwarranted and unwise intrusion
into the province of the jury.”120 I argue instead, however, that acquittalﬁrst instructions constitute the more signiﬁcant intrusion. Admittedly, it
seems odd—if jury independence and secrecy are of such great importance—to ask a jury to complete additional forms or require it to speak
with the judge more often. It could be asserted that my argument is paradoxical: instructions encroach on the jury’s province, but courts should
nevertheless provide more of them. However, encouraging states to eliminate acquittal-ﬁrst instructions and to add a requirement of partial verdict
forms or jury polling before declaring a mistrial, is fully consistent with
allowing juries complete freedom to deliberate. Because the forms or polling
would be required only as a last resort, after the jury had completed its
deliberations and immediately before declaring a mistrial, there would be no
intrusion on or interruption of the jury’s free and conﬁdential deliberations.121
C ONCLUSION
Blueford v. Arkansas will aﬀect many citizens whose liberty hangs in the
balance. Chief Justice Roberts strayed from the Double Jeopardy Clause’s
fundamental protections by holding, ﬁrst, that a jury foreperson’s report in
an acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdiction did not constitute an acquittal; and second,
that the trial judge was not required to poll the jury to establish manifest
necessity to declare a mistrial. The opinion is overly formalistic, and does
little to alleviate the issues plaguing acquittal-ﬁrst jurisdictions. Fortunately,
states remain at liberty to combat the problems associated with messy
acquittal-ﬁrst jury instructions, which do little besides confuse both judges
and juries,122 by eliminating this type of instruction altogether.
Alternatively, requiring judges to poll juries or to provide partial verdict
forms before declaring a mistrial would properly protect defendants’ rights.
In spite of Blueford’s holding, states remain free to oﬀer protections that
extend beyond the constitutional minimum and some have continued to
mandate that trial judges poll juries to provide proper protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.123 I am advocating not that states unreasonably
120
121

People v. Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
See O’Keefe, supra note 85, at 898 (“A deadlocked jury has completed its deliberations;
inquiry into whether a partial verdict has been reached will therefore not be intrusive.”).
122 See, e.g., Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2059-60 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(noting that even the trial judge was confused by the Arkansas jury instructions).
123 See, e.g., State v. Fennell, �� A.�d ���, ��� (Md. ����) (“[B]efore a proper ﬁnding of
manifest necessity for a mistrial could have been made, the trial judge should have inquired into
the jury's status of unanimity prior to its discharge.”).
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extend the scope of the Constitution’s protections or overturn hundreds of
years of precedent, but only that they adopt procedural safeguards that will
provide every citizen with the protections enumerated in the Double
Jeopardy Clause; no more, no less.
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